Using a sample of 137 hospitals over the period [1998][1999][2000][2001][2002] in the English National Health Service, we estimate the elasticity of hospital costs with respect to waiting times. Our cross-sectional and panel-data results suggest that at the sample mean (103 days), waiting times have no signi…cant e¤ect on hospitals'costs or, at most, a positive one. If signi…cant, the elasticity of cost with respect to waiting time from our cross-sectional estimates is in the range 0.4-1. The elasticity is still positive but lower in our …xed-e¤ects speci…cations (0.2-0.4). In all speci…cations, the e¤ect of waiting time on cost is non-linear, suggesting a U-shaped relationship between hospital costs and waiting times: the level of waiting time which minimises total costs is always below ten days.
Introduction
Waiting times are a major policy issue in many OECD countries. Average waiting times range between four and eight months for common procedures like cataract and hip replacement. There are at least two rationales for explaining the existence of waiting times.
The …rst is that waiting times act as a rationing mechanism that help to bring into equilibrium the demand for and the supply of health care (Lindsay and Feigenbaum, 1984; Martin and Smith, 1999; Cullis, Jones and Propper, 2000) : in the absence of price rationing and if bene…t from treatment is to some extent unobservable, waiting times may deter patients with small bene…t from asking for treatment. A second rationale is that waiting times reduce the cost of provision of elective surgery. When demand is stochastic, waiting times may reduce idle capacity, therefore inducing a more e¢ cient use of resources (Iversen 1993 , Iversen 1997 , Barros and Olivella 2005 . This argument is likely to hold when waiting times are low: hospital cost reduces with waiting times as a consequence of the lower excess capacity. However, as suggested by Iversen (1993) , there might be a point over which higher waiting times increase costs, which may be due to the higher costs of managing the waiting list. For example when waiting times are very long, there might be an increase in the resources needed for repeated examinations of patients (since their status might change during the course of the waiting), an increase in treatment costs and in length of stay (if severity deteriorates while waiting), and an increase in cancellation rates. There is therefore, at least theoretically, a level of waiting time which minimises total costs. Above this level, higher waiting times increase hospital costs.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically estimate the elasticity of hospital costs with respect to waiting times. We use a sample of 137 acute hospitals over the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] in the English National Health Service (NHS). Our cross-sectional and panel-data results suggest that at the sample mean (103 days), waiting times have no signi…cant e¤ect on hospitals'costs or, at most, a positive one. If signi…cant, the elasticity of cost with respect to waiting time in our cross-sectional estimates is in the range 0.4-1. The elasticity is still positive but lower in our …xed-e¤ects speci…cations (0.2-0.4). In all speci…cations the e¤ect of waiting time on cost is non-linear, suggesting a U-shaped relationship between hospital costs and waiting times, which is consistent with the Iversen (1993) model. The level of waiting times which minimises total costs is always below ten days.
Our results therefore suggest that the level of waiting times observed in our sample is above the one which minimises total costs. If healthcare providers could ration the demand by dumping or neglecting treatment to patients with low expected bene…t (explicit rationing), we should not observe providers with waiting times held above the cost-minimising level. However, if waiting times also have a rationing role, then waiting times might as well be above the cost-minimising level. There might be several reasons why explicit rationing might not be feasible for the providers: the bene…t for the patients might be at least to some extent unobservable; even if bene…t is perfectly observable, patients with low expected bene…t might feel entitled to treatment in the NHS: clinicians might therefore prefer to add patients on the waiting list, rather than taking responsibility for explicitly declining treatment to patients. Therefore, our model indirectly supports the theories that model waiting time as a demand-rationing mechanism.
The study is organised as follows. The next section presents the methods. Section 3 describes the data. The results are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Methods
De…ne C as the total cost of a representative hospital, w as the waiting time of the patients admitted for treatment, and y as the number of patients treated. Following Iversen (1993 Iversen ( , 1997 , the cost function of a hospital can be represented by
with C y > 0: higher activity increases costs; C w < 0 if w < e w, C w = 0 if w = e w and
The relationship between waiting times and costs is U-shaped: waiting times reduce costs for low levels of waiting times, while waiting times increase costs for 3 high levels of waiting times. Iversen (1993 Iversen ( , 1997 argues that for low waiting times, higher waiting times reduce hospital costs, as a consequence of lower excess capacity: if the demand for health care is stochastic, higher waiting times reduce the probability that the system has idle capacity and therefore reduce costs (for a formal model with a stochastic demand function and the e¤ect of waiting times on idle capacity, see also Goddard, Malek and Tavakoli (1995); Olivella (2003) also assumes that waiting times reduce costs because waiting times allow for a more e¢ cient use of hospital equipment).
Iversen (1993) suggests that there is a level of waiting times over which higher waiting times increase costs. For high waiting times, the reductions in costs from a marginal increase in waiting, in terms of lower probability of idle capacity, become negligible. In contrast, for high waiting times, a marginal increase in waiting may increase the costs of managing the waiting list: for example, more resources might be needed for repeated examination of patients (if the health status of the patients deteriorates in the course of the waiting); treatment costs might increase due to higher cancellations rates if patients scheduled for treatment have in the meanwhile found treatment somewhere else; therefore overall prioritisation costs will be higher when waiting times are higher.
There is then, at least theoretically, a level of waiting time which minimises total costs.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate empirically the relationship between hospital costs and waiting times. As far as the authors are aware, this paper is the …rst that estimates empirically such a relationship. We estimate three types of regressions: pooled OLS, panel …xed e¤ects and panel random e¤ects. The pooled OLS model is given by:
where C it is the cost of hospital i at year t, w it is waiting time, y it is a vector of outputs; x it is a vector of control variables, d t is a vector of time dummies, and u it is the idiosyncratic error. According to the theoretical literature discussed above, we should expect 1 < 0 and 2 0.
An alternative approach is to assume that individual e¤ects are speci…c to each obser-4 vation. This leads to the …xed e¤ects model:
The hospital-speci…c …xed-e¤ects i capture individual unobserved heterogeneity. An alternative to the …xed e¤ects is the random-e¤ects models, where i v N ( ; 2 ) and
In this formulation the individual e¤ects are randomly iid distributed over the population of hospitals. Fixed-e¤ects and random-e¤ects models can be compared by the Hausman test, which tests for systematic di¤erences in coe¢ cients between the two models (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) .
It might be argued that the relationship between costs and waiting times is endogenous.
If a hospital has high costs, it is more likely to have longer waiting times. There are several channels through which this may happen.
First, more ine¢ cient hospitals have higher costs (due for example to poor management): if higher ine¢ ciency also implies higher ine¢ ciency in the management of the waiting list, then ine¢ cient hospitals may have both higher costs and higher waiting times (a positive correlation). If the researcher has no access to variables correlated with ine¢ ciency, then the OLS estimates of Equation (2) will be biased upwards. We use at least two control variables that might be correlated with ine¢ ciency: length of stay and proportion of day cases. Keeping other factors constant, more ine¢ cient providers have a higher length of stay and a smaller proportion of day cases.
Second, hospitals with higher quality might have a higher cost and at the same time attract a higher number of patients, which leads to a higher waiting time (again, a positive correlation). We use at least two control variables that might be correlated with quality:
length of stay and (age and gender adjusted) readmission rates. Keeping other factors constant, providers with higher quality should have a higher length of stay and lower readmission rates.
If there is some residual unobserved e¢ ciency and quality, the OLS might still be biased. However, by estimating a …xed e¤ects model, all unobserved ine¢ ciency and unobserved quality will be captured by the individual …xed e¤ects, as long as quality and ine¢ ciency are time invariant, which seems plausible over short intervals of time.
Data
The Hospital costs also depend on the e¢ ciency in the use of resources. We control for the number of day cases as a proportion of elective surgeries and the average length of stay.
More e¢ cient hospitals are expected to have a higher proportion of surgeries carried out 6 on a day case basis, and a lower average length of stay. The capital stock is proxied by the number of available beds (Vita, 1990; Jacobs, Smith and Street, 2006, p.31 ) .
The quality of services is proxied by the percentage of emergency readmissions within 28 days from treatment. This variable is standardised by age and gender. Finally, the degree of competition in the geographical market is measured through the number of hospitals within a 20km radius (Propper, Burgess and Green, 2004; Siciliani and Martin, 2007) . We do not include salaries because information is not readily available. Also, salaries are nationally agreed and therefore there is little variation in salary expenditure across hospitals. With respect to the e¢ ciency of resource use, each hospital admits on average 50% of the elective patients as day cases, with an average length of stay of 5.3 days. The proportion of emergency readmissions within 28 days is around 6%.
With the exception of emergency admissions, readmissions and day cases, all the other continuous variables (including total cost and waiting times) are included in the log scale, which reduces skewness and allows the interpretation of coe¢ cients as elasticities. Emergency admissions, readmissions and day cases are kept in levels. Since they are measured as percentages, the associated coe¢ cients can also be interpreted as elasticities. After the log transformation, the mean total cost in the sample is equal to the median.
Results
The results of the regression analysis for pooled OLS and …xed e¤ects are reported in tables 3 and 4. The dependent variable in both regressions is the log of total hospital cost 7 (lntotcost) in real values of 2002. Table 3 shows the OLS results for seven di¤erent speci…cations. We add regressors progressively in order to test the stability of results. The basic regression (column (1)) includes mean waiting times (linear and quadratic e¤ect) and activity indicators (inpatient spells and outpatient attendances), and controls for the HRG index, London e¤ect and year. We then progressively add controls for capital stock (available beds (2)), demand on resources (emergency admissions (3)), e¢ ciency on use of resources (daycases (4) and average length of stay (5)), quality of service (emergency readmissions (6)) and competition (number of competitors in a 20 km radius (7)). Given the limited coverage of our sample, the inclusion of the quality and competition indicators reduces signi…cantly the number of observations. In Table 4 there are only six speci…cations for panel regressions because the competition indicator, the HRG index and the London dummy either do not vary or vary little over time, which prevents …xed e¤ects estimations.
We initially estimated the regressions using a translog speci…cation, which is a secondorder Taylor approximation adding squared terms for the activity indicators. However, since the square and cross terms were not signi…cant (apart from the squared waiting-time e¤ect), we decided to exclude them from the …nal speci…cation. The OLS regressions were estimated using standard errors robust to both heteroscedasticity and the serial correlation among observations of the same hospital over the years. Thus we report both the total number of observations (N ) and the number of clusters (N clusters). Table 3 reports pooled cross-section estimates using unbalanced samples. By 'unbalanced'we mean that as additional regressors are added the sample size decreases, falling from 440 observations in the basic regression to 319 observations in the regression with all independent variables.
All the regressions have been estimated with both linear and quadratic e¤ects for waiting times, which allows us to control for nonlinearities in the hospital cost response to waiting times. Two reasons guided the choice of this functional form. First, it gives a direct test of Iversen's suggestion of a nonlinear e¤ect of waiting times. As explained in Section 2, we should expect to …nd a negative coe¢ cient for low levels of waiting times and a positive coe¢ cient for high levels. Second, the inclusion of a quadratic e¤ect of waiting times eliminates misspeci…cation problems. In all the speci…cations in Table 3 the RESET test is not signi…cant, which suggests that the functional form is correctly speci…ed.
Let us now focus on the coe¢ cients estimated by the regressions, starting with waiting times. In all regressions the coe¢ cient for the linear component is negative, while the quadratic is positive. This implies that waiting times have an initial negative impact on costs. However, after some point the e¤ect is reversed and waiting times start to increase costs. Therefore, in principle there is an optimal level of waiting times that minimises total costs (this optimal level is calculated below).
Although the e¤ect of waiting times is consistent with the theory, the estimated coe¢ -cients are not always statistically signi…cant. In the basic regression (column (1) of Table   3 ), the estimated e¤ect of waiting times is not signi…cant, either jointly or separately.
However, the other variables display signi…cant e¤ects. As expected, both inpatient and Next we include readmission rates (column (6)), which has a positive but not statistically signi…cant e¤ect on hospital cost. In sharp contrast with previous speci…cations, the e¤ects of waiting times and available beds cease to be signi…cant. One possible explanation for this result is that adding readmission rates causes a sizable reduction in the sample, making the e¤ect of waiting time insigni…cant. Another explanation is that lower readmission rates (higher quality) generate both higher costs and higher waiting times (through lower demand). But column (7) suggests that the e¤ect of readmission has no signi…cant e¤ect on costs. Also the positive coe¢ cient on readmission rates suggests that lower readmission would reduce costs (in contrast with what we would expect). We therefore favour the …rst explanation.
Finally we evaluate the e¤ect of local competition from other hospitals (column (7)).
The estimated e¤ect of competition is negative, although not signi…cant.
From Table 3 it is not immediate to infer whether the e¤ect of waiting time on costs is positive or negative when evaluated at the sample mean. Recall that at the sample mean the waiting time is 102:9 days. Di¤erentiating the equation in Column (3), we obtain " C w = @ log C it =@ log w it = 0:93 + 2 0:21 log(102:9) = 1: 02. Therefore, the elasticity of cost with respect to waiting time is markedly positive. Using similar computations, we can show that the elasticity is smaller for Column (5), " C w = 0:75, and even smaller for Column (7), " C w = 0:37.
It is also of interest to calculate the level of waiting time which minimises total costs.
By setting @ log C it =@ log w it = 0 from Columns (3), (5) and (7) we obtain a waiting time respectively equal to 9:2, 9:8 and 7:4 days. Therefore, if waiting times reduce costs for low levels of waiting times, this e¤ect vanishes after waiting time has reached less than ten days.
In addition to the pooled cross-sectional analysis we also estimate …xed-and randome¤ects panel regressions. Results from the …xed-e¤ects estimations are reported in Table 4 .
Notice that the time-invariant regressors (like London dummy and number of competitors)
are excluded from the …xed-e¤ects regressions. The e¤ect of waiting times estimated by …xed-e¤ects is qualitatively similar to the pooled OLS case, with a negative coe¢ cient for the linear component and a positive coe¢ cient for the quadratic one. However, the coe¢ cients are not signi…cant (although jointly signi…cant in Columns (1) and (2)). This might be due to the ine¢ ciency of the …xed-e¤ects estimator. A more e¢ cient model is the random-e¤ects estimator but this will give unbiased estimates only if the individualspeci…c e¤ects are not correlated with the independent variables. The Hausman test rejects the random e¤ects model: individual-speci…c e¤ects are therefore correlated with independent variables. Nevertheless, the random-e¤ects model might provide an idea on the degree of ine¢ ciency of the …xed-e¤ects model. We therefore report in Table 5 also the random e¤ects estimations. In most speci…cations the e¤ect of waiting times is signi…cant and in accordance with the hypothesis proposed by Iversen (1993) . The linear coe¢ cient of waiting times is negative, but the quadratic one is positive, suggesting that increasing waiting times up to a certain level decreases costs, but past this level the e¤ect is reversed. The elasticity of cost with respect to waiting time (
is always positive at the sample mean for both the …xed and the random e¤ects models, respectively in the range 0.21-0.37 for the …xed e¤ects and 0.31-0.85 for the random e¤ects.
Again, the level of waiting time which minimises total costs is below ten days.
Conclusions and policy implications
Waiting times are a signi…cant feature of several healthcare systems. This paper has investigated the e¤ect of waiting times on hospital costs. Iversen (1993) has argued that for low waiting times, higher waiting times reduce costs due to lower idle capacity, but there might be a point over which higher waiting times increase costs, due to the higher costs of managing the waiting list. Using a sample of 137 acute hospitals over the period 1998-2002 in the English National Health Service (NHS) we have tested empirically the relationship between hospital costs and waiting times. Our cross-sectional and paneldata results suggest that at the sample mean (103 days), waiting times have no signi…cant e¤ect on hospitals'costs or, at most, a positive one. Our model indirectly supports theories 11 which model waiting times as a mechanism to ration demand. If demand could be rationed explicitly, waiting times should be below or at most equal to the cost minimising level, which is in contrast with our …ndings. Although our results suggest that waiting times might have a strong rationing rationale, they do not imply that waiting times are an optimal rationing system. As pointed out for example by Barzel (1974) , waiting times generate a loss to patients but do not generate bene…ts for the providers (at least if waiting time is weakly above the cost-minimising level). If expected bene…t was perfectly observable by the provider, an ideal rationing mechanism would provide swift treatment to patients with high expected bene…t, refuse treatment to patients with low expected bene…t, and set a waiting time which is strictly below the cost minimising level. Recent policies that focus on the development of explicit prioritisation criteria (Siciliani and Hurst, 2005 ) might encourage clinicians in the future to rely more on explicit rationing and less on waiting-time rationing. 
